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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------------------------
BEVERLY KERR, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
THOMAS ALDEN KERR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Case No. 18329 
-------------------------------------------------------------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
AND DISPOSITION BY THE COURT BELOW 
This appeal arises out of a Motion of Defendant for the 
Modification of a Divorce Decree reducing or eliminating the 
payment of alimony and child support and Plaintiff's Order to 
Show Cause seeking payment of back alimony through August of 
1981 in the amount of $5,891.00. After an evidentiary hearing 
held on August 24, 1981, before the Honorable Ernest F. Bald-
win, Jr., District Judge, the Court denied Defendant's Motion 
for Modification and awarded Plaintiff a Judgment for $5,891.00 
in unpaid alimony through August, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an Order of this Court vacating the 
Judgment of the trial court and awarding Defendant a reduc-
tion of alimony and/or child support retroactively to the 
date the Motion for Modification was filed. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While Defendant in the Statement of Facts contained 
in his brief on this appeal makes some ostensible effort 
to summarize the evidence taken by the trial court, the 
Defendant fails to review or even acknowledge significant 
testimony upon which the decision of the trial court was 
based. For that reason, Plaintiff has little choice but 
to expand upon the statement of facts set forth in Def en-
dant' s brief. 
On April 5, 1979, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Dis-
trict Judge, entered his Memorandum Decision granting di-
vorce to each of the parties, distributing the marital prop-
erty and setting child support and alimony. (R. 183-88). The 
Memorandum Decision was followed by the Court's entry of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 207-18) and a 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce (R. 219-24) on May 11, 1979. 
Both the Memorandum Decision and the Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce provided for the payment of $799.00 per month alimony, 
and $450.00 per month child support for the minor child of 
the parties. In paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Findings of 
Fact (R. 213-14), the Court expressly recognized that the 
amounts awarded for child support and alimony would not 
cover the costs and expenses of maintaining the Plaintiff 
and the minor child of the parties in the family home, and 
- 2 -
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that the Plaintiff would accordingly be required to look to 
her own resources and income to supplement those support and 
maintenance payments. 
In compliance with the directive of Judge Conder, Plain-
tiff in fact did look to her own separate income and assets 
for partial maintenance of herself and the minor son of the 
parties. The investment income, however, was simply insuffici-
ent to pay the bills and during the year 1979, Plaintiff was 
required to liquidate and deplete her assets by the sum of 
$3,600.00. (R. 934). As a consequence of her inability to 
meet her living expenses from her interest and dividend in-
come without depleting the assets from which that income 
was derived, Plaintiff sought employment and commenced working 
for the Veteran's Administration in October of 1979. (R. 933). 
Plaintiff was asked why she simply didn't continue to deplete 
those assets in lieu of seeking employment. Her answer was 
as follows: 
"Well, the interest I get from my assets 
helps pay the expenses. If I use them 
all up now, they would be gone in two, two 
and a half years, and I would not have that 
income. At this point, I can't get work 
that is going to pay more than I am making 
now, and I need that money to operate." 
(R. 934-35). 
The evidence further reflected that Plaintiff's total in-
come for the year 1981 through the date of the hearing in the 
court below, excluding any alimony or child support, was 
$4,365.06 from her employment, together with an additional 
- 3 -
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$4,688.03 from interest and dividends, for a total of 
$9,053.09. (Ex. 5-P). During the same period of time, Plain-
tiff's total expenses in maintaining herself and her minor 
son was $17,529.46, (Ex. 6-P) or a short fall of nearly 
$8,500.00. In as much as she had received only $4,900.00 in 
child support and alimony payments from Defendant through 
August of 1981, (Ex. 5-P) Plaintiff had been required to 
further liquidate an additional $3,012.00 in assets in order 
to make up the short fall. (R. 936). Plaintiff also testified 
that the expenditures shown on Exhibit 6-P reflected only 
cash outlays made during the year to date and did not in-
elude other debts, including counsel fees, that she had 
not been able to pay. (R. 936). 
Defendant testified that his net income, after taxes, 
had gone from $3,257.58 at the time of the original trial 
in 1978 (Defendant's Exhibit 4), to $2,302.32 for the first 
eight months of 1981. (Ex. 3-D). No evidence was introduced 
regarding any change in expenses or other circumstances of 
Defendant. Defendant's net average income from the practice 
of dentistry included a net income for the month of April of 
only $298.37. (Ex. 3-D). His gross receipts for that month 
however, were within $500 of the preceding month and nearly 
$2,000 more than the gross receipts for May. (Ex. 3-D). The 
unusually low net income for April was the consequence of a 
one-time non-recurring expense of nearly $3,000.00 for the 
repair of certain dental equipment. (R. 923). 
Defendant claimed it was the combination of the change 
- 4 -
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of circumstances of Plaintiff obtaining employment and De-
fendant's reduction in income which required the modification 
of the divorce decree with respect to the payment of alimony 
and child support. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN REFUSING TO MODIFY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The Standard on This Appeal. 
In arguing before this Court that all that need be shown 
to justify a modification of the Decree of Divorce is a change 
in circumstances, Defendant has significantly understated the 
standard against which this appeal must be judged. As noted 
by this Court in Ring v. Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155, 
158 (1973) Defendant's burden is more than just a mere change 
in circumstances. This Court put it as follows: 
"Defendant must furthermore sustain 
the burden of proving that there has been 
a substantial change in the material cir-
cumstances of either one or both of the 
parties since the decree was entered. 
[Emphasis as in original.] 
This same principle was later reinforced in Carter v. Carter, 
563 P.2d 177, 179 (Utah 1977) where this Court delineated the 
scope of its review of a denial by the trial court of a motion 
to modify a divorce decree. 
"As opposed to Defendant's insistence 
that the trial court should have modified 
the decree, it is appropriate to have in 
mind that the burden of persuading the trial 
court that there has been such a change in 
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circumstances as to justify such modification 
rests upon him; and that the same rules of 
review apply in supplementary proceedings, 
as in original divorce matters; that is, that 
we survey the record in the light most f av-
orable to the findings and determination 
made by the trial court; and that we do 
not interfere therewith unless it appears 
that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against his findings or that he abused 
his discretion." [Emphasis added.] 
The evidence in the record does not clearly preponderate 
against the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion, but to 
the contrary clearly supports and sustains the decision of 
the trial court. When Defendant's appeal is measured against 
the criteria established in the above-referenced case law, it 
is apparent that the Judgment of the trial court should be 
sustained. 
2. A Change in Defendant's Income Does Not Automatically Result 
In a Modification of the Divorce Decree. 
Defendant seems to believe that a reduction in his income 
axiomatically requires a reduction in the payment of child 
support and alimony. That argument was quickly dispatched by 
this Court in Carter v. Carter, supra. There, a defendant who 
had been in good health at the time of the divorce decree and 
earning approximately $21,000 per year in construction work 
had suffered some impairment in his health and his earning 
capacity had been reduced to $12,000 per year. The defendant 
accordingly sought a reduction in alimony from $200 per month 
to $100 per month. The trial court denied the request for 
modification and on appeal, this Court affirmed. At 563 P.2d 
- 6 -
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178~79, the Court laid out the following rule, which is 
dispositive of Defendant's contention on this appeal: 
"In regard to the major problem, the 
defendant's argument that the evidence 
compels a reduction in the alimony pay-
ment from $200 to $100 per month. He is 
mistaken in his assumption that the amount 
of alimony payable should be correlated 
in percentage to his income, to be scaled 
up or down as his income may vary. His 
earning capacity and his income are, of 
course, important factors to be considered. 
But that is only part of the total cir-
cumstances to be considered as to what is 
appropriate and equitable. Another major 
one is what are plaintiff's needs and 
requirements; and there is no showing that 
there has been any decrease therein." 
Defendant's contentions in the instant case are clearly 
subject to the same fate. Defendant has shown nothing more 
than a claimed change in his level of income. Defendant's 
average net monthly income for the eight months of 1981 was 
still over $2,300 per month, even including the abberational 
month of April. No effort was made and no evidence was in-
troduced to show that a net income after taxes of $2,300 per 
month was not sufficient to meet the alimony and child support 
obligations imposed in the original divorce decree of $1,249.00 
per month. !/ 
!/ If anything, the evidence in the record is to the contrary. SUbsequent 
to the entry of the Divorce Decree, the ~fendant made a voluntacy 
$3,200 investnent in Pardners Restaurants (R. 907) and during 1981, 
gave an autorrobile to one of the married children of the parties at the 
very time he was refusing to make the alinony payments to the Def en-
dant. (R. 909). This hardly sounds like a person living on the edge 
of poverty. 
- 7 -
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3. Plaintiff's Need for Alimony and Child Support Has Not 
Diminished. 
As this court noted in Carter, of at least equal impor-
tance with Defendant's claimed diminished income is the con-
tinued need and requirements of the Plaintiff. In spite of 
Plaintiff's obtaining employment with the Veteran's Administra-
tion, those needs and requirements have not materially changed 
since the time of the Divorce Decree. 
As noted earlier in the Statement of Facts, Judge Conder 
in the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recog-
nized that the alimony and child support payments awarded to 
Plaintiff would be insufficient to meet the expenses of Plain-
tiff and the minor child of the parties. Judge Conder expressly 
indicated that Plaintiff would be required to supplement the 
the alimony and child support awarded from the Defendant and 
provide a portion of those needs herself. As Plaintiff testi-
fied, the sum of $4,000 in income earned by Plaintiff from the 
investments and savings awarded to her as her separate property 
was simply inadequate to make up the full short fall between 
the child support and alimony and her every day and normal 
living expenses. 
As a consequence of the continued short fall, Plaintiff 
was forced to deplete the very assets upon which that needed 
income was generated, liquidating $3,600 of those assets in 1979 
with an additional $3,000 having been liquidated in the first 
eight months of 1981. In order to provide the continued sup-
plementary income which was clearly anticipated by Judge 
- 8 -
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Conder, Plaintiff was left with only one viable choice. She 
could not continue to deplete the assets upon which her in-
come was dependent. The only alternative was to seek employ-
ment. It is only by the combination of the income derived 
from her employment, together with the continued interest 
and dividends from her separate investments that Plaintiff is 
able to make up the short fall between her actual expenses 
and the award of alimony and child support granted by the 
Decree of Divorce. ll 
Defendant erroneously contends that whatever may have been 
anticipated by Judge Conder at the time of the original Di-
vorce Decree is immaterial, and that the only fact which the 
trial court in the instant case was entitled to examine was 
that Plaintiff was not working at the time of the original 
Decree, and was working at the time of the hearing on Defen-
dant's Motion for Modification. That is not, however, the 
case law of this State. 
2/Defendant's argument that Plaintiff had voluntarily limited her \te10rk 
hours when she could have further augmented her incane by working 
additional hours per week is of little relevance in this case. Work-
ing the available additional hours would have resulted in adding only 
$48 every two weeks to Plaintiff's gross incane. (R. 943). Plaintiff 
further testified that the reason why she had cut back her hours fran 
a full 40 hours per week to 32 hours was to enable her to be hone at 
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon when her son arrived hone fran school. 
She testified that her presence at hare and the supei:vision that 
added had resulted in an increase in grade point average for the 
child from a 1.8 to 3.1. (R. 944). Would Defendant really have 
Plaintiff trade that needed parental supervision for an increase 
in gross incare of some $96.00 per I1Dnth? 
- 9 -
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~ In Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620, 624 (1972) 
this Court expressed the applicable rule as follows: 
"[A] divorce decree containing awards for 
support based on either expressed or as-
sumed facts contemplated by . • • the court 
• • • should not be modified when the con-
templated facts are obvious or agreed to by 
the parties and in turn incorporated in the 
decree, in which event the continuous juris-
diction of the court to modify should not 
be used to thwart the expressed or obvious 
intentions of the • • • court - unless such 
contemplated facts lead to manifest injus-
tice or unconscionable inequity." 
There is no doubt that where the findings of the trial court 
expressly anticipate that the plaintiff will be required to 
supplement alimony and child support payments through her own 
income, the foregoing rule is applicable and the subsequent 
obtaining of employment by the Plaintiff does not constitute 
a material change in circumstances. In Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah 
2d 87, 475 P.2d 1021 (1970), this Court rejected a claim for 
reduction in alimony and child support payments predicated 
upon the fact that the plaintiff had obtained employment sub-
sequent to the entry of the original decree of divorce. In 
finding that there had been no material change in circumstances, 
the Court noted: 
"[T]he decree of divorce, when granted, 
contemplated that the Plaintiff would 
secure employment and contribute to her 
own support." 
See, also, Short v. Short, 25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 (1971). 
Again, Defendant has simply failed to meet his burden of 
demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in 
- 10 -
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finding that there was no substantial change in any material 
circumstance. Defendant's appeal is without merit and the 
judgment below should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION WERE GRANTED, 
IT COULD NOT BE MADE RETROACTIVE 
BACK TO THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE 
MOTION FOR MODIFICATION 
Defendant correctly concedes in his brief that the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to make any modification 
in child support and alimony retroactive is in accord with 
Utah law. This Court did, in fact, clearly speak on that 
issue in Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d 580, 583 
(1967). The court there was faced with a similar request 
for a retroactive modification of a divorce decree. In re-
spending to that claim, the Court explained the rule of 
law applicable in this State as follows: 
"The usual rule is that a judgment for 
alimony payable in monthly or other per-
iodic installments cannot be changed or 
modified after the installments have 
become due. [Citations omitted.] 
The right to such accrued in-
stallment payments vested in the Plain-
tiff upon the due date of each install-
ment, and the Plaintiff is entitled to 
interest thereon at the legal rate until 
payment is made. [Citations omitted.] 
Accordingly, the lower court was correct 
in its holding that it had no power or 
authority to change or modify the Nevada 
judgment as to the accrued installments 
of alimony thereunder. 
Defendant has demonstrated no good reason why this 
court should now modify or overturn that long standing 
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rule of law in this jurisdiction. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD 
OF HER REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES 
ON THIS APPEAL 
As demonstrated hereinabove, the Judgment entered by the 
trial court denying Defendant's Motion for Modification of the 
Decree of Divorce and awarding to Plaintiff back alimony and 
child support should be affirmed. This appeal was necessitated 
solely by the actions of the Defendant and is without merit. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the rules set down in Keiger v. 
Keiger, 59 Utah 2d 167, 506 P.2d 441 (1973) and Ehninger v. 
Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977), this Court should enter 
its Order declaring Plaintiff is entitled to her reasonable 
attorney's fees on this Appeal and remanding the case to the 
District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of 
such fees to be awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court acted properly and within its discre-
tion denying Defendant's Motion to Modify the Decree of Divorce 
by reducing or eliminating the payment of child support and 
alimony and in awarding to Plaintiff judgment for back alimony 
and child support payments unpaid by Defendant. The Judgment 
of the District Court should, accordingly, be affirmed in all 
respects. Plaintiff should further be awarded her costs of 
appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees, and the case 
- 12 -
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should be remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary 
hearing on the amount of such costs and fees. 
1982. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this / 7.,(_ day of No Ve tM_ ~ (;.rr , 
GLEN E. DAVIES 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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